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NOTES

MEANING OF THE TERM LABOR DISPUTE IN THE
PENNSYLVANIA UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION LAW
What is a "labor dispute" within the meaning of the Pennsylvania Unemployment Compensation Law?' The Pennsylvania Superior Court has wrestled
with this term in a number of compensation cases, first when it spelled a temporary disqualification (Section 401) for benefits, and later when it became grounds
for indeterminate or so-called "permanent" disqualification (Section 402). 2Two
recent cases illustrate the complexity of the problem involved.
Under the terms of the original act as amended in 19423 and 1945,' if claimant's unemployment was due to a voluntary suspension of work because of an
industrial dispute he could obtain benefits but had to undergo a waiting period.
Therefore, it might be to claimant's advantage to show that his unemployment
was due to an industrial dispute, since otherwise he risked being classified as a
voluntary quit (Section 402 b), and denied benefits altogether.
An outstanding case under this phase of the law was Duquesne Brewing Co.
of Pittsburgh v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review.6 (Hereinafter
referred to as the Loerlein case.) The claimant (Loerlein) was a member of an
independent union which the CIO and AFL raided. The majority of the independent local unions went CIO but claimant's local affiliated with the AFL. Claimant's union then went on strike to compel the employer to recognize it as bargaining agent.
Claimant argued that this was an industrial dispute and that he, therefore,
could qualify for benefits at the expiration of the statutory period. He relied on
the Superior Court's decision in the Miller case6 where the court said an industrial
dispute "does not have to be between employers and employees." It was there held
that the dispute could be between the employees and their union or bargaining
agent "providing it involves the employer and affects terms or conditions of employment." Loerlein claimed this was such a dispute. The Unemployment Compensation Board of Review agreed with claimant and subjected his claim to the
temporary (four weeks) disqualification. On appeal by the employer, contending
that claimant should be disqualified during the entire period of his unemployment,
the Superior Court reversed the board.
The court said this was a "jurisdictional contest for labor control." Apparently the court was qualifying its broad statement in the Miller case. But the court
I Act of December 5,
2 The original Act

1936, P. L. 2897, 43 P. S. 802.
used the term "industrial dispute" and the amended provision em-

ployed the term "labor dispute," but the Superior Court has used these terms interchangebaly. Susque.
hanna Collieries Co. v. U. C. Board of Review, 137 Pa. Super. 110, 112, 115; Barns v. U.

C.Board of Review, 152 Pa. Super. 429, 432.
B Act of April 23, 1942, P. L. 60, 43 P. S. 802.
4 Act of May 29, 1945, P. L. 1145, 43 P. S. 802.
5 162 Pa. Super. 216, 56 A.2d 269 (1948).
6 152 Pa. Super. 315, 31 A.2d 740 (1943).
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goes on to say this case dicd not present a "single aspect" of an industrial dispute.
This addition would seem to weaken considerably the court's previous decision.
One may agree that this was a jurisdictional dispute but to say that the factual
situation presented not a single aspect of an industrial dispute is saying that a
jurisdictional dispute and an industrial lispute are in no way similar or related.
That such a clear distinction exists is to be doubted. However, the decision was
7
affirmed by the Supreme Court.
In 19478 the legislature changed Section 402 in two resplects. (1) The term
"labor dispute" was substituted for "industrial dispute."' (2) By the more important revision, a claimant was made ineligible for benefits as long as his unemploym'ent was due to a stoppage of work because of a labor dispute, unless he fell
under three categories of exemptions. 1"
Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review 1 (hereinafter referred to as the Curcio case) was the first case to reach
the court under the new law. Curcio, the claimant, worked for appellant where an
open shop was maintained. The CIO and AFL began to organize the employees
and each union requested appellant to grant bargaining rights to it. When the
company refused to recognize the CIO, the members of this union went on strike.
Curcio, however, was a member of the AFL which had not taken any strike action.
He tried to continue to work but was restrained by a massved picket line which
threatened to use force against those attempting to enter the plant.
When Curcio presented his claim for benefits, the Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, looking to the court's decision in the Loerlein case, concluded that the present facts did not constitute a labor dispute and awarded him
benefits since his unemployment was involuntary.
But again the board was reversed. The Superior Court said that these facts
clearly showed there was a labor dispute and, therefore, claimant was disqualified
because he was a member of the same occupational class of workers (production
workers) to which the striking CIO employees belonged. The fact that the
employer refused to recognize the CIO (except on NLRB certification) was held
to make this situation a labor dispute. The court attempted to distinguish this
case from the Loerlein case by saying that here the interests of both employer
and employee were at stake. Were they any less so in the Loerlein case? The court
goes on to say they never intended to txtend the Loerlein decision beyond facts
7 359 Pa. 535,

59 A.2d 913 (1948).

8 Act of June 30, 1947 P. L. 1186, 43 P. S. 802.
9 Note 2, supra.
10 Claimant had to prove (1) he was not participating in or particularly interested in the
dispute; (2) he was not a member of an organization participating in or directly interesetd in the
dispute; and (3) he was not of the same grade or class of workers of which immediately before
commencement of the stoppage there were members employed at the premises at which stoppage
occurs, any of whom are participating in or interested in the dispute.
11 68 A.2d 393 (1949).
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similar or identical to those found there. On close analysis one finds it difficult
to observe any material distinction in the facts. This case seems to present every
bit as much of a jurisdictional dispute as did the Loerlein case. In both cases the
gist of the controversy was that rival unions were competing for bargaining rights.
Furthermore, on the basis of ordinary justice, Curcio would seem to be entitled to benefits since he wanted to work and was prevented from doing so
through no fault on his part or on the part of his union.
This decision seems to leave wide open the question, of what facts constitute
a labor dispute. The Miller and Loerlein cases were difficult enough to harmonize
on their facts but one could at least conclude from reading the latter case that a
jurisdictional "labor dispute" was not, in the opinion of the Superior Court, a
"labor dispute" in the field of unemployment compensation. The line of distinction between the Loerlein and Curcio cases, however, is even more tenuous regarding the application of the term "labor dispute" in claims for benefits. Although the court has attempted to harmonize its decisions, there seems to be reason for seriously questioning whether the Loerlein case has not, in effect, been
overruled. If this is the result, it can probably be ascribed to judicial disapproval
of benefit payments in labor dispute cases and the fact that a broad interpretation
of the amended labor dispute clause (with its disqualification for the duration
of the stoppage) will tend to reduce eligibility for benefits in claims arising
out of labor and industrial controversies. As indicative that the court has shifted
to a broader application of the term, and to add to the uncertainty of the law on
the subject, is the following statement on page 391 of the Curcio opinion:
"The inference is reasonable therefore that the legislature in the
present Act did not intend the screening of facts through the mesh
of any fixed definition of a labor dispute to determine by a process as
simple as that whether a claimant is entitled to unemployment compensation."
One questions the propriety of allowing a law so vital to so many to be so uncertain. It is suggested that legislative clarification of the meaning of the term
"labor dispute" in this statute would be to the best interests of employees and employers as well as government agencies and officials administering the law.
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